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Introduction 
After decades of military rule, Myanmar’s 2010 General Election appeared to be a watershed 
moment. The emergence of a democratic political system, the launching of a formal peace 
process in 2011 and Aung San Suu Kyi’s 2015 election victory inspired hopes that Myanmar 
was embarking upon what the World Bank dubbed as a ‘triple transition’: from authoritarian 
military rule to democratic governance, from a centrally directed economy to a market-
oriented economy, and from 60 years of conflict to sustainable peace in the country’s border 
areas.  
Yet, alongside these positive changes a number of the country’s border areas have 
experienced some of the worst fighting for more than 25 years. There have been very 
significant escalations in violence since 2010, especially in Rakhine State (against the 
Rohingya population), and in Kachin State and northern Shan State in the north-east of the 
country close to the border with China. In these two northern border areas – which are the 
focus of this article – previous ceasefires have broken down (notably the 17-year ceasefire 
with the Kachin Independence Army or KIA) and new insurgencies have emerged. Internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) now number in the hundreds of thousands and there are continued 
reports of human rights violations.  
The country’s high-profile democratic transition encouraged a rush from the international 
community to engage in Myanmar. Nationally, space opened up for peacebuilding activities, 
but on the ground in conflict-affected borderland areas this space remains extremely 
constrained. Peacebuilding efforts face the challenge of how to engage in a peace process 
where formal dialogue, peace conferences and government-led efforts to strengthen a 
nationwide ceasefire agreement operate in tandem with ongoing military offensives, 
worsening violence, increasing restraints on local, national and international development 
agencies, and sustained attacks on press freedom.  
This article explores why the peace process in Myanmar has faced major difficulties in 
reaching an initial nationwide ceasefire, and how peacebuilding, humanitarian and 
community development initiatives in Kachin State and northern Shan State continue to face 
huge challenges despite the country’s democratic transition and formal peace process.  
The first part analyses one of the central puzzles in Myanmar’s peace process: why renewed 
violence broke out throughout Kachin State and northern Shan State at the same time as a 
national peace process was launched. It demonstrates how the late 2000s marked a 
culmination of political, social and economic processes that simultaneously provided the 
foundations for a military-orchestrated political transition at the centre and triggered renewed 
armed conflict in Kachin State and northern Shan State. It situates the current peace 
process within a deeper understanding of the contested and unresolved processes of state-
building and centre–borderland relations – showing how the country’s war-to-peace 
‘transition’, its experiences of ceasefire arrangements, and the prospects for peace look very 
different when viewed from the margins rather than from the capital, Yangon, or abroad. The 
second part explores the profound challenges that have faced peacebuilding initiatives led 
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by local organisations in the northern Myanmar–China borderlands. In doing so, the article 
critically reflects upon the overly optimistic framing of Myanmar’s so-called triple transition 
and argues that international donors and non-governmental organisation (NGOs) need to 
centre the experiences of local peacebuilding initiatives when re-assessing how to engage in 
the country’s faltering peace process. This article draws upon extensive interviews 
conducted by the authors with civil society organisations and local and international NGOs in 
Lashio, Myitkyina and Yangon between 2015 and 2018. 
 
De-centring understandings of Myanmar’s transition 
Since independence, much of the country’s borderlands with China have remained beyond 
government control. The KIA administered much of Kachin State while the powerful 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) controlled large amounts of territory along the China 
border and supported an array of other ethnic armed groups. Securing control of the 
northern Shan and Kachin borderland region has been central to the state-building agenda 
of successive post-colonial governments in light of its geopolitical importance close to China, 
its strategic location on the main Myanmar–China trade routes, and its abundant natural 
resources. However, the region’s topography of remote hills and dense forests, and the back 
channels of cross-border support ethnic armed groups have received, limited the 
effectiveness of the Myanmar army’s counter-insurgency campaigns. The government’s use 
of military force to achieve this has fuelled longstanding grievances and protracted armed 
conflict in the ethnically diverse borderlands, where the power and legitimacy of the central 
state has historically been weak and contested. 
 
The false promise of ceasefires and transition 
A series of ceasefire deals in the late 1980s and early 1990s – initially with the four main 
splinter groups of the CPB (which had collapsed in 1989) and culminating with the 1994 KIA 
ceasefire – gradually transformed the political economy of Kachin State and northern Shan 
State. By using ceasefire deals to stabilise one of the most contested regions of the country, 
Myanmar’s military government was able to concentrate on restoring control in the rest of the 
country after nationwide pro-democracy protests of 1988 and continued insurgency 
elsewhere – including the launch of devastating counter-insurgency offensives in the 
Thailand–Myanmar borderlands of southern Shan State and Karen State throughout the 
mid-late 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
Given the precariousness of the government’s finances, the ceasefires were also used to 
establish the stability required to accelerate resource extraction, especially of jade and 
timber, and expand formal cross-border trade with China. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the military government legalised cross-border trade through government-controlled trade 
gates – the most important of which was the Muse–Ruili crossing in northern Shan State 
which links China to Mandalay – and devised new foreign investment and land laws, 
allowing the government to allocate large-scale land and resource concessions.  
 
For the KIA and other armed groups in northern Shan State, a ceasefire was more logical 
than continuing to fight in light of declining support from China and increasing threats from 
the Myanmar army; it also allowed them to capitalise on emerging economic opportunities. 
However, although the ceasefires in Kachin State and northern Shan State largely held until 
2010, little progress was made in addressing longstanding political grievances, creating a 
‘no-war-no-peace’ environment in this region.  
 
The ceasefire period came to be defined by three dynamics: a prolonged process of 
militarisation in borderland areas which saw the number of Myanmar army units and military-
backed militia groups proliferate in Kachin and northern Shan State; the opening up of 
borderland areas for economic ‘development’; and a stalled peace process in which 
government promises of political dialogue never materialised. Over the next two decades, 
this region became central to the country’s crony-controlled economy as a result of the vast 
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revenues generated from logging, jade mining (an industry estimated by Global Witness to 
have generated more than $30 billion in 2014, equivalent to 48% of Myanmar’s annual GDP), 
the region’s illicit drug economy (heroin and methamphetamines), hydropower dams, large-
scale agribusiness concessions, expanding cross-border trade with China, and the 
construction of pipelines that transect former conflict zones to deliver offshore oil and gas to 
China. The region’s economic transformation has been underpinned by establishing and 
enforcing, often through violence, highly unequal control over land and resources which 
serve the interests of a powerful nexus of military and private sector actors, comprising 
military elites, local militias, Myanmar business elites, cross-border and international 
investors, and in some cases ethnic armed groups. The ceasefire period also saw the 
reinvigoration of nationalist tropes within the military, which have long acclaimed the army’s 
role as a safeguard against internal fragmentation and external subjugation by the country’s 
powerful neighbours.  
 
Thus the very ceasefire agreements that served to reduce levels of outright violent conflict 
exposed borderland populations to an array of violent and destructive forces of militarisation, 
continued counter-insurgency, exclusionary nationalism, dispossession and destructive 
development that served to reinvigorate long-held resentment against the central 
government.  
 
Distrust in the ceasefire process in Kachin and Shan States was also heightened by a 
number of events since the mid-2000s. In 2005, the military forced the surrender of smaller 
ceasefire groups and arrested a number of high-profile Shan political and military leaders. In 
2008, the country’s new Constitution locked-in the military’s control over the political system 
by enshrining the military’s right ‘to participate in the National political leadership role of the 
State’ and providing it with effective veto power over any constitutional reform. This was 
followed in 2009 by a government declaration that all ceasefire armed groups were to be 
absorbed into the Myanmar army as Border Guard Forces (BGF). The government also 
declared that after September 2010 all ceasefires would be ‘null and void’ and groups which 
had not converted into BGFs would be deemed insurgents. Throughout the 1990–2008 
period the military government consistently informed ceasefire groups that, as a transitional 
government, it had no mandate to enter into political dialogue until a new constitution had 
been enacted. The BGF proposal, therefore, marked a clear turnaround in which ceasefire 
groups were now told to surrender autonomy prior to any form of political dialogue. The 
government’s position also offered no acknowledgement of the systems of governance 
administered by ethnic armed groups that provided health, education and justice systems to 
large populations. 
 
By the late 2000s, the military government’s increasing control over the country’s 
borderlands, the country’s improved financial position and the promulgation of the 2008 
constitution encouraged military elites to instigate a transition to civilian rule and capitalise 
on the international support such a process would bring. The government’s decision to 
initiate a formal peace process in 2011 was underpinned by a belief among military elites 
that they were in a strong enough position to manage this process on their own terms.  
 
However, for those living in Kachin State and northern Shan State there was deep distrust of 
government promises of ceasefires, peace and development. These terms have become 
dirty words, weighed down by experiences of continued violence, expropriation and 
insecurity. Myanmar’s ‘transition’ in 2010-11 therefore came at a time of crisis – from the 
perspective of many armed groups and borderland populations – in the ceasefire system of 
the previous two decades. This included a legitimacy crisis, in which the leadership of 
various armed groups, especially the KIA, became tarnished by claims that they were 
profiting from the exploitation of the people and environments they claimed to be protecting; 
a crisis of strategy, as the hope that ceasefire agreements would pave the way for more 
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meaningful political dialogue faded away; and a military crisis, as ethnic armed groups faced 
increasing pressure from the Myanmar army. 
 
The China effect 
Centre–periphery tensions in northern Myanmar, and their impact on the peace process, 
have been further complicated by diverse cross-border influences from neighbouring China. 
China’s decision in the 1980s to decrease its support for ethnic armed groups and 
strengthen government-to-government relations was instrumental in shaping the military 
government’s ceasefire strategy. Weapons sales, protection in UN Security Council debates, 
and increased investment and border trade from China were all important in strengthening 
Myanmar’s military government throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Stabilising Myanmar 
government control over the country’s borderlands has also been viewed by some within 
China as a way to address security threats, especially the cross-border flow of drugs, and to 
provide a more secure environment for Chinese trade and investment. For business and 
political elites in Yunnan especially, cross-border trade and investment was viewed as an 
essential component of the province’s development strategy.    
 
Yet, the Chinese government remains wary of Western influence in Myanmar’s borderlands, 
and continues to see the benefits of maintaining a buffer zone that limits Myanmar military 
presence along its border. The influx of refugees has also increased concerns in China 
about ongoing counter-insurgency offensives along its borders. Furthermore, the reliance of 
border-based armed groups on maintaining support from China arguably makes them more 
pliant to Chinese interests than Myanmar military elites, which remain wary of China’s 
influence in Myanmar. Chinese security forces and business elites have enduring formal and 
informal relationships with various ethnic armed groups and elites in northern Myanmar that 
remain important in enabling them to secure access to resources, intelligence and protection. 
And some border areas are much more closely integrated with China, reflected by their use 
of Chinese currency, language, time and SIM cards. Closer government-to-government 
relations therefore co-exist alongside a set of interests that have simultaneously empowered 
non-state armed groups and networks of power, communication and resources beyond state 
control.  
 
The peace process in Kachin State and northern Shan State stands at the apex of three 
competing pressures: (1) the interests of Myanmar’s ruling elites who view the peace 
process as a mechanism through which to make ethnic armed groups compliant, rather than 
a reason to enter into genuine political dialogue with them; (2) powerful scepticism among 
ethnic armed groups and borderland populations towards the rhetoric of ceasefires, political 
dialogue, and inclusive development that surrounds the peace process; and (3) diverse – 
and at times conflicting – cross-border political, security and business interests.  
 
Peacebuilding amidst conflict  
National-level processes 
At a national level, the peace process that emerged after 2011 sought to formalise existing 
ceasefires, establish new ones with groups the government previously hadn’t dealt with, and 
renew ceasefires that had broken down, notably with the KIA. These agreements were to 
provide the foundation for a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA), which Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s government claimed would provide the starting point for more substantial political 
dialogue – including on issues of federalism, revenue-sharing and the future status of ethnic 
armed groups – through a series of Union Peace Conferences. The Myanmar government 
has retained strong control over the peace process and rejected the need for formal external 
mediation.  
 
However, the NCA process has faced huge challenges, especially in northern Myanmar. 
Although a ‘nationwide’ ceasefire agreement was finalised in October 2015, many of the 
country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups refused to sign. The rejection of ceasefire 
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offers and a return to fighting rejuvenated the legitimacy of the KIA, while fresh insurgencies 
have broken out in northern Shan State. A number of the country’s most powerful armed 
groups established the so-called Northern Alliance in 2016 to oppose the government-led 
peace process, demanding a genuine federal union in which the rights of self-determination, 
regional autonomy and equality were guaranteed. In response, the Myanmar army has 
launched renewed counter-insurgency offensives and has backed a large number of local 
militia groups. Violent conflicts have also emerged in northern Shan State between ceasefire 
and non-ceasefire armed groups. The years following the launching of Myanmar’s formal 
peace process in 2011 have witnessed some of the heaviest fighting in Kachin and northern 
Shan State for more than three decades.  
 
Sub-national peacebuilding efforts 
At the sub-national level, there have been various initiatives within conflict-affected areas 
aimed at building trust, support and engagement with the peace process. This article 
focuses on the experiences of activities conducted by local organisations. A number of civil 
society organisations (CSOs) emerged in the 1990s and 2000s to address the challenges 
facing communities in Kachin State and Shan State. While some were able to operate within 
the country – often through religious networks – others were located beyond the country’s 
borders, mostly in northern Thailand. These organisations undertook a wide range of 
activities, including conducting research in conflict-affected areas, drawing attention to on-
going human rights abuses, supporting IDPs and refugee populations, and supporting a 
range of low-profile health, education and development activities. Following the launch of the 
government’s peace process in 2011, existing and new organisations gained formal 
permission to operate within the country, while the decision by many donors to prioritise 
support for in-country activities, and cuts in funding to organisations based outside the 
country – provided added incentives and pressures to establish projects in Myanmar.  
 
The priority for many organisations was to address the damage inflicted on populations by 
decades of conflict. Initiatives have focused on trying to make the government, ethnic armed 
groups and international donors and NGOs more responsive to the needs of populations in 
conflict-affected areas. This has included attempts to strengthen the voice of marginalised 
populations (including a specific focus on women and youth) in the peace process. 
Programmes have also sought to identify and address major social and economic issues 
facing impoverished communities, including improving health and education services, 
promoting small-scale community-led development initiatives, addressing the environmental 
damage created by decades of unchecked resource extraction and addressing both historic 
and contemporary cases of land-grabbing. This has also involved efforts to ensure that new 
international development initiatives are sensitive to the challenges of operating in conflict-
affected areas. These initiatives have sought to begin to address underlying grievances and 
lay the foundations for a more sustainable and equitable peace. However, as violent conflict 
escalated, priorities often shifted to emergency humanitarian work. 
 
Challenges for local organisations 
The most fundamental of challenge facing these peacebuilding initiatives is the fact that the 
Myanmar army – the de facto authority in the region – views the peace process as 
secondary to its priorities of consolidating state authority. Under the 2008 constitution, the 
military enshrined its control over the key ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border 
Affairs. Myanmar’s civil service – the General Administration Department (GAD) – is housed 
under the Ministry of Affairs and is largely staffed by military and ex-military personnel. Local 
organisations remain under heavy surveillance, to the extent that military intelligence officials 
join their meetings. High levels of scrutiny also discourages communities from engaging with 
organisations, as they remain fearful of repercussions from military, police and army-backed 
militias. In many areas, ethnic armed groups continue to provide services to marginalised 
populations, but opportunities to work through these systems remain extremely constrained 
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– especially in northern Myanmar where the main armed groups have not signed ceasefires 
with the government. 
 
Local authorities’ continued distrust of CSOs also presents huge challenges to gaining 
access and permission to work in many borderland areas. Personalities and personal ties 
continue to be more important than formal structures and systems. Organisations are 
required to constantly assess where power lies in the country’s bureaucratic structures and 
who best to approach, creating a system of perpetual uncertainty where the reasons for 
gaining or being denied permission remain opaque and are not easily replicated. 
Organisations are required to navigate multiple levels of authority, including the Union 
(national) level (through the Ministry of Home Affairs), the state level, and through local 
township authorities (part of the GAD). Since the NLD government came to power, it has 
become even less clear where power lies, as parallel civilian and military structures operate 
alongside each other.  
 
In this system, organisations’ requests for access to undertake activities are passed back 
and forth between different levels of government decision-making. Organisations are 
regularly told at local level that their requests require higher permission, only then to be told 
by central ministries that decisions have to be made by local authorities based on the 
situation on the ground. This provides a subtle way to restrict programmes without being 
seen as directly confrontational. The ongoing sensitivity and ambiguity surrounding the 
peace process continues to make officials reluctant to approve of any activity that could run 
the risk of upsetting the fragile balance of power that exists in conflict-zones between the 
army, ethnic armed groups, and militias. The fear of making the wrong decision has long 
encouraged both senior figures and lower-ranking cadres to stall rather than approve work in 
areas under their jurisdiction.   
 
A second fundamental challenge is that ethnic minority populations continue to be treated 
with suspicion and hostility by the Myanmar army. The military often does not distinguish 
between armed groups, CSOs and local populations from the same ethnic group. The 
upsurge in violent conflict in Kachin and northern Shan State since 2010 has created both a 
huge local need for peacebuilding and humanitarian support and renewed distrust from the 
military towards local populations, which the military often views as supporting insurgency. 
Organisations trying to support IDPs throughout northern Shan State and Kachin State face 
difficulties not only in moving through conflict zones but also in navigating the military’s 
response to the IDP crisis. Large shipments of emergency food aid – including from 
international organisations – have regularly been denied to ensure food does not reach 
ethnic armed groups, placing huge pressure on small-scale, often clandestine networks. At 
times emergency supplies have been able to move back and forth across the border with 
China in order to reach IDP camps. However, these cross-border networks remain unofficial 
and subject to sudden change, reflecting the multiple interests that CSOs have to navigate. 
 
Military distrust of peacebuilding and community development initiatives is also rooted in the 
fact that attempts to address issues facing borderland populations threaten to undermine 
and destabilise the political deals and hybrid governance structures that emerged during the 
ceasefire period and which underpin the military’s control over contested territories. This is 
epitomised very clearly in the dynamics of Myanmar’s illicit drug economy. The country is a 
major producer of opium and methamphetamines, with production concentrated in Shan and 
Kachin states. Increasing drug use throughout the ceasefire period has caused huge 
damage among borderland communities, and the peace process has created very little 
opportunity to address these problems. This is largely attributable to the fact that drugs are 
deeply embedded in localised governance structures: in many areas, army-backed militias 
deployed to act as local counter-insurgency forces and to protect development projects are 
given the opportunity to run legal and illegal businesses – primarily drugs. This is a way for 
the army to strengthen their loyalty and enable them to be self-financing. Despite the huge 
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social damage wrought by drugs in Myanmar’s borderlands and the aspiration to use the 
peace process as an opportunity to start to address this, there is strong reluctance among 
authorities to risk destabilising the delicate local power structures that have sedimented 
around the drug economy.  
 
Conclusion 
The worsening violent conflict in Kachin State and Shan State has led many donors and 
organisations to critically reflect on Myanmar’s transition and reconsider how they engage in 
peacebuilding in the country’s borderlands. This article suggests some ways in which these 
efforts can be recalibrated.  
 
First, it emphasises the need to better understand the country’s current transition from the 
vantage point of those at the margins of the Myanmar state. Much external engagement with 
Myanmar’s peace process has been based upon the assumption that opening up political 
space at the centre – through supporting the country’s democratic transition, Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the national-level peace process – would provide the foundations for peacebuilding 
throughout the country’s borderlands. However, this approach fails to account for how 
political transition at the centre and renewed violence in the margins are intimately 
connected. The experiences of local peacebuilding initiatives demonstrate that the same 
dynamics that facilitated the launching of the peace process at the national level – especially 
the Myanmar military’s belief that they were in a strong enough position to manage this 
process on their own terms – have constrained opportunities to address the drivers of 
conflict in Kachin and northern Shan State.  
 
Second, the experiences of local peacebuilding initiatives demonstrate that the prospects for 
working in these regions are shaped by the interplay of: local dynamics – in Myanmar’s case 
how to operate in highly fragmented sub-national systems of governance; centre-borderland 
relations, especially ongoing efforts by the Myanmar military to control the peace process 
and to consolidate state authority through securitising borderland regions; and cross-border 
dynamics, notably the influence of diverse and at times contradictory Chinese interests. To 
engage effectively in Kachin State and northern Shan State, organisations will need to 
ensure that they develop partnerships and channels of communication that enable them to 
better understand and operate across these different scales.      
 
Third, this article emphasises the need for more rigorous political economy analysis of 
Myanmar’s peace process that centres borderland experiences of ceasefires and 
‘development’. The difficulties confronting local CSOs are rooted in the fact that the 
challenges communities face in Kachin State and northern Shan State – violence, drugs, 
poverty and rising inequality – are embedded in the systems of borderland governance that 
the Myanmar army used to expand its authority during the previous ceasefire period. Strong 
government control over the peace process, and the subsequent limitations placed on 
international organisations, has meant that much support is directed towards technical 
aspects of peacebuilding. This approach has offered limited scope to situate the peace 
process within a deeper understanding of processes of statebuilding in the country’s 
borderlands, and the local politics and power relations surrounding these processes. Local 
organisations often have the clearest understanding of systems of borderland governance, 
their likely impact on peacebuilding programmes, and how to navigate these systems, but 
they are also in a highly vulnerable and exposed position. Learning from the experiences 
and knowledge of local organisations, integrating this knowledge into programme planning 
and design, and developing ways to support local organisations’ efforts to navigate the 
complex and often violent structures of authority in Myanmar’s borderlands, are important 
starting points for international organisations rethinking how to work for peace in Myanmar’s 
fragile and violent borderland regions. 
 
 
